_{The Claims}

In The United States District Court For The Northern District Of Florida Tallahassee Division

Jane Doe, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Joseph A. Ladapo, et al., Defendants.

Preliminary Injunction

This action presents a constitutional challenge to a Florida statute and rules that (1) prohibit transgender minors from receiving specific kinds of widely accepted medical care and (2) prohibit doctors from providing it. The treatments at issue are GnRH agonists, colloquially known as “puberty blockers,” and cross-sex hormones. This order grants a preliminary injunction.

• There are legitimate concerns about fertility and sexuality that a child entering puberty is not well-equipped to evaluate and for which parents may be less-than-perfect decisionmakers.
• One cannot know [from these studies] whether treating transgender adolescents with GnRH agonists will cause comparable adverse results in some patients. But the risk that they will is a risk a decisionmaker should reasonably consider.

Bias In Medical Organizations

• ...there are those who incorrectly but sincerely believe that gender identity is not real but instead just a choice.
• The great weight of medical authority supports these treatments. The widely accepted standards of care require competent therapy and careful evaluation by a multidisciplinary team before use of GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones for treatment of gender dysphoria. But the widely accepted standards of care support their use in appropriate circumstances. The standards have been unanimously endorsed by reputable medical associations, even though not unanimously endorsed by all the members of the associations.

International Views

• No country in Europe—or so far as shown by this record, anywhere in the world—entirely bans these treatments.

Malpractice

• And there are [of course] remedies already in place in Florida for deficient medical care.

Continuation Of Treatment

• The primary goal [of treatment with GnRH agonists] is to delay and eventually avoid development of secondary sex characteristics inconsistent with the patient’s gender identity...

Off-label Use of FDA-approved Drugs

• Use of these drugs [GnRH agonists] to treat gender dysphoria is “off label.”
• Obtaining FDA approval of a drug is a burdensome, expensive process. A pharmaceutical provider who wishes to market a new drug must incur the burden and expense because the drug cannot be distributed without FDA approval. Once a drug has been approved, however, the drug can be distributed not just for the approved use but for any other use as well. There ordinarily is little reason to incur the burden and expense of seeking additional FDA approval.

Conclusion

The plaintiffs thus are entitled to a preliminary injunction of appropriate scope.

It is ordered:

• The motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF Nos. 30 and 57, is granted in part.
• The motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 57, is denied as moot.
• A preliminary injunction is entered against these defendants: Joseph Ladapo, et al.
• The preliminarily enjoined parties must not take any steps to prevent the administration of GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones to Susan Doe, Gavin Goe, or Lisa Loe in accordance with professional standards that would apply to use of the same substances to treat patients with other medical conditions.
• The preliminarily enjoined parties must not take any steps to enforce against Susan Doe, Gavin Goe, or Lisa Loe, or their parents or healthcare providers, Florida Statutes § 456.52(1) & (5) or Florida Administrative Code rules 64B8-9.019(1)(b) or 64B15-14.014(1)(b).
• This preliminary injunction will take effect upon the posting of security in the amount of $100 for costs and damages sustained by a defendant found to have been wrongfully enjoined. Security may be posted by a cash deposit with the Clerk of Court.
• This preliminary injunction will terminate upon entry of a final judgment or when otherwise ordered.
• This preliminary injunction binds the defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys—and others in active concert or participation with any of them—who receive actual notice of this injunction by personal service or otherwise

So ordered on June 6, 2023.

United States District Court Middle Court Of Alabama Northern Division

Plaintiffs' Motion For A Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary Injunction

The Act makes it a Class C felony for any “person” to “engage in or cause” the performance of certain medical treatments on any minor, “if the practice is performed for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor's perception of his or her gender or sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor's sex as defined by [the] act.” This prohibition infringes upon the fundamental constitutional rights to parental autonomy and equal protection, violates the right to freedom of speech, is void for vagueness, and conflicts with the Affordable Care Act...Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum of Law, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction be granted without security.

Substantive Due Process Claim

• The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.CONST. AMEND. XIV.
• Fundamental rights are “those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights as well as certain ‘liberty’ and privacy interests implicit in the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause and the penumbra of constitutional rights.” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2005).

Equal Protection Claim

• The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
• Sex-based classifications are constitutional only when they satisfy a heightened standard of review known as intermediate scrutiny. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). To satisfy this standard, a classification must substantially relate to an important governmental interest. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). The State bears the burden to proffer an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2017). An exceedingly persuasive justification is one that is “genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).

Void-For-Vagueness Claim

• Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a penal statute must “define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2002)). A federal court reviews a void-for-vagueness claim only when the litigant alleges a constitutional harm. Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1349–50 (11th Cir. 2011).

Free Speech Claim

• The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech[.]” U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. At its core, “the First Amendment means that government” generally “has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

Irreparable Harm

• Harm “is ‘irreparable’ only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies.” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am., 896 F.2d at 1285. An irreparable harm is one that is “actual and imminent, not remote or speculative.” Odebrecht Const., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 1288 (11th Cir. 2013). The risk of suffering severe medical harm constitutes irreparable harm. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 483 (1986) (explaining that a risk of suffering “a severe medical setback” is an irreparable injury); Blaine v. N. Brevard Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 312 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (finding irreparable harm where doctor plaintiffs could not provide necessary medical care to their patients).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the final two factors favor injunctive relief.

• For these reasons, the Court GRANTS in part Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 7) and ENJOINS Defendants from enforcing Section 4(a)(1)–(3) of the Act pending trial. The Court GRANTS in part the United States’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 62) to the same degree and effect. All other provisions of the Act remain enforceable.

DONE and ORDERED May 13, 2022.

In The United States District Court Eastern District of Arkansas Central Division

Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs bring their claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the First Amendment.

Equal Protection

The Banned Care Improves Patient Health

Risks and Side Effects

Desistance And Regret

Proper Evaluation And Informed Consent

• The Standards of Care “recommend healthcare professionals involve relevant disciplines including mental health and medical professionals to reach a decision about whether puberty suppression, hormone initiation, or gender-related surgery for gender diverse and transgender adolescents are appropriate and remain indicated throughout the course of treatment until transition is made to adult care.” Id. Before initiating gender-affirming medical treatment to adolescents, the WPATH Standards of Care state that the patient should have a history of gender diversity lasting years and meet the criteria for a gender dysphoria diagnosis. Id. at 50-51. The diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria includes six months of clinically significant distress or social or occupational impairment. Id. This six-month period is in addition to the years of gender diversity history that the Standards of Care require. Id.

Due Process

• The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause also includes a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997).
• “The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv’s, 927 F.3d 396, 419 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[P]arents’ substantive due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children includes the right to direct their children’s medical care.”). Parents are presumed to be acting in the best interest of their children. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).

First Amendment

Conclusion

• For these reasons, the Court hereby orders that Defendant Tim Griffin, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Arkansas, and all those acting in concert with him, including employees, agents, successors in office, and the members of the Arkansas State Medical Board are permanently enjoined from enforcing House Bill 1570, Act 626 of the 93rd General Assembly of Arkansas, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-9-1501 to 20-9-1504 and 23-79-164. The Clerk is directed to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2023.

United States District Court Southern District of Indiana Indianapolis Division

Order Granting In Part Plaintiff's Motion For a Preliminary Injunction

The State has a strong interest in enforcing democratically enacted laws. And Defendants have shown that there are important reasons underlying the State's regulation of gender transition procedures for minors. Still, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing some likelihood of success on their claims that S.E.A. 480 would violate their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and free speech rights under the First Amendment. Under the evidence available at this preliminary stage, there is not a "close means–end fit" between the State's important reasons for regulating the provision of gender transition procedures to minors and S.E.A. 480's broad ban of those procedures. So, when the State's interests are weighed against the likelihood that Plaintiffs will be able to show that S.E.A. 480 would violate their constitutional rights and the risk of irreparable harm, Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims

• "The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause guarantees that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'" Hope v. Comm'r of Ind. Dep't of Corr., 9 F.4th 513, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).

Sex-based Classifications and Heightened Scrutiny

• "Generally, state action is presumed to be lawful [under the Equal Protection Clause] and will be upheld if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050. That "rational basis test, however, does not apply when a classification is based upon sex." Id.
• Sex-based classifications are [instead] "subject to heightened scrutiny," requiring "the state to demonstrate that its proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.'" Id.; accord Sessions v. Morales–Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 59 (2017) (recognizing "the heightened scrutiny that now attends 'all gender-based classifications'"). "This requires the state to show that the 'classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1050 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)).

Heightened Scrutiny Applied to S.E.A. 480

• "Successful defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender . . . requires an 'exceedingly persuasive justification." Sessions v. Morales–Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 58 (2017). "For a gender-based classification to withstand such scrutiny, it must 'serve important governmental objectives,' and 'the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–29 (2003) (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533). In other words, there must be a "close means–end fit." Sessions, 582 U.S. at 68

First Amendment Speech Claims

Irreparable Harm

• "Harm is irreparable if legal remedies are inadequate to cure it." Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 545 (7th Cir. 2021). "Inadequate 'does not mean wholly ineffectual; rather, the remedy must be seriously deficient as compared to the harm suffered.'" Id.

Conclusion

• Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED in part. Dkt. [9]. A separate injunction shall issue contemporaneously with this order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). The assigned magistrate judge is asked to enter a case management plan for resolving this case. The Court will then set a trial date.

So Ordered. Date: 6/16/2023

In The United States District Court For the Western District Of Kentucky

Plaintiff's Motion For Preliminary Injunctive Relief

This Court should follow the growing weight of authority and enter a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Treatment Ban.

The Treatment Ban is Subject to Heightened Constitutional Scrutiny

• The Equal Protection Clause forbids the States from “deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

The Treatment Ban Cannot Withstand Heightened Scrutiny

• To survive heightened scrutiny, discriminatory classifications must substantially relate to an important governmental interest. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524. This standard demands an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for discrimination. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47, 58 (2017). A justification based on overbroad generalizations is not sufficient, Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, and any asserted justification must reflect the law’s “actual purpose” when enacted, not a hypothetical rationale or one “invented post hoc in response to litigation,” Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).

The Treatment Ban Fails Even The Rational Basis Review

• That test requires a “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).

The Treatment Ban Violates The Due Process Clause

• The Due Process Clause protects “against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–20 (1997). Where a fundamental right is at issue, strict scrutiny applies. Under strict scrutiny, a law will fail unless it is “narrowly tailored to further” a “compelling state interest.” Middleton v. City of Flint, 92 F.3d 396, 404 (6th Cir. 1996).

Conclusion

• For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to enter a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the Treatment Ban, SB 150 § 4(2)(a)–(b).

Dated: May 22, 2023

In The United States District Court For The Middle District Of Tennessee Nashville Division

Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff-Intervenor United States' Motion For A Preliminary Injuction

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 21, “Motion”), which is accompanied by a memorandum in support (Doc. No. 33).

Equal Protection Claim--Heightened Scrutiny

Rational Basis Review

• To survive rational basis review, there must be a “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993). The relationship between the classification and the asserted goal may not be “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; see also Ray, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 939 (rejecting Ohio’s justifications for disallowing transgender people to change sex marker on birth certificate under rational basis review, “because there is no logical connection between the Policy and proffered justifications”).

Irreparable Harm

• A party’s harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction “is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages.” Husted, 697 F.3d at 436 (quoting Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 550 (6th Cir. 2007)).
• The “absence of irreparable injury is always fatal to a motion for a preliminary injunction.”  Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett, 482 F. Supp. 3d 673, 680 (M.D. Tenn. 2020).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the United States’ motion for a preliminary injunction.

In The United States District Court For The Northern Division Of Oklahoma

Complaint For Declaratory, Injunctive, And Other Relief & Statement Of Interest

The United States respectfully submits this Statement of Interest under 28 U.S.C. § 5171to advise the Court of the United States’ view that, by denying transgender minors—and only transgender minors—access to medically necessary and appropriate care, SB 613 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim.

Intermediate Scrutiny

Quasi-Suspect Class

SB 613 Cannot Survive Intermediate Scrutiny

• To withstand intermediate scrutiny, the government actor must show that the challenged action “serves important governmental objectives” and that the “discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (“VMI”) (requiring an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for a sex-based classification) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). “The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.” VMI, 518 U.S. at 533.
• Moreover, where intermediate scrutiny applies, the “justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation,” and it “must not rely on overbroad generalizations.” VMI, 518 U.S. at 533. A classification does not withstand intermediate scrutiny when “the alleged objective” of the classification differs from the “actual purpose.” Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 730. “[A] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973); see also Ladapo, 2023 WL 3833848, at *11 (referring to Florida’s “purported justifications” for the state’s ban on gender-affirming care, including alleged risks of certain care, as “largely pretextual”).
• The Equal Protection Clause commands that “all persons similarly situated . . . be treated alike.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).

SB 613 is Not Substantially Related To Oklahoma’s Purported Interest of Protecting Youth

Conclusion

SB 613 bans certain forms of medically necessary care for transgender minors, while leaving non-transgender minors free to receive the same procedures and treatments. The law fails intermediate scrutiny because banning medically necessary care to treat gender dysphoria is not substantially related to serving an important government objective, and because Oklahoma lawmakers’ asserted purpose—“protecting” minors from certain care—is pretextual. Instead, the law expresses Oklahoma lawmakers’ moral disapproval of transgender people, endangers the health of transgender youth, blocks parents and health care providers from making individual determinations regarding the appropriate care of transgender children, and threatens health care providers with criminal and civil liability, as well as professional licensing sanctions, simply for treating minor transgender patients consistent with broadly accepted standards of medical care. SB 613 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim.

In The District Court Of Lancaster County, Nebraska

Complaint And Petition For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order seeks a temporary pause of a two-subject bill enacted in clear violation of the Nebraska Constitution’s single-subject rule. For three reasons, the government’s response to that motion confirms that a TRO should issue.

Single-Subject Claim

• Article III, § 14, of the Nebraska Constitution requires that “[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject, and the subject shall be clearly expressed in the title. No law shall be amended unless the new act contains the section or sections as amended and the section or sections so amended shall be repealed.”

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, and those provided in Plaintiffs’ temporary-injunction brief, the Plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to issue a temporary injunction and to deny the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

*Due to the contemporary timeline of each state's legislative session(s), the following cases lack key information, designating this section non-representative.

In The Fourth Judicial District Court Missoula County

Plaintiffs' Brief In Support Of Motion For Preliminary Injunction

The Act unconstitutionally burdens the rights of transgender minors in Montana to receive critical, medically necessary, and potentially life-saving health care. However, the Act allows the use of the same treatments when provided to minors for the purpose of treating other conditions...Based on these considerations, Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing the Act, directly or indirectly, against the transgender youth across Montana whose lives hang in the balance.

Equal Protection--The Act Discriminates Based On Sex

• “[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being . . . transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). If the legislature cannot “writ[e] out instructions” for determining whether treatment is permitted “without using the words man, woman, or sex (or some synonym),” the law classifies based on sex. Id. at 1746.

Equal Protection--The Act Discriminates Based On Transgender Status

Equal Protection--Heightened Scrutiny--The Act Affects A Suspect Class

• “A suspect class is one ‘saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.’” In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 33, 951 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1997) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)); see also In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 198, 683 P.2d 931, 938 (1984).

Equal Protection--The Act Fails Heightened Scrutiny

• “Under the strict scrutiny standard, the state carries the burden of demonstrating the challenged law or policy is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest and only that interest.” Stand Up Mont., ¶ 10 (citations omitted).
• Any compelling state interest “must be closely tailored to effectuate only that compelling state interest.” Wadsworth v. State, 275 Mont. 287, 302, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (1996) (citation omitted). Further, “the State, to sustain the validity of such invasion [to a fundamental right], must also show that the choice of legislative action is the least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state objective.” Id. (citation omitted).

Equal Protection--The Act Fails Any Level Of Review

• “Under the rational basis test, the law or policy must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Snetsinger, ¶ 19.

The Act Violates The Right To Parental Autonomy

• The Due Process Clause of the Montana Constitution states: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 17. This Due Process Clause protects “the fundamental right of a parent to make decisions regarding the care of their children, including, among other things, the upbringing, education, health care, and mental health of their children.” Stand Up Mont., ¶ 28 (internal quotations omitted).
• The Montana Legislature codified this fundamental right. § 40-6-701(1), MCA (a “government entity may not interfere with the fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing, education, health care, and mental health of their children” unless it satisfies strict scrutiny). It further provided: “[a]ll fundamental parental rights are exclusively reserved to the parent of a child without obstruction or interference by a government entity, including but not limited to the rights and responsibilities to . . . make and consent to all physical and mental health care decisions for the child.” § 40-6-701(2)(e), MCA.

The Act Violates The Right To Privacy

• The Montana Constitution provides that the right of individual privacy is essential to a free society and “shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.

The Act Violates The Right To Seek Health

• The Montana Constitution provides that Montanans have a fundamental and inalienable right to “seek[] their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 3; Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 2012 MT 201, ¶¶ 22–24, 366 Mont. 224, 231, 286 P.3d 1161, 1166. This right encompasses “the right to seek and obtain medical care from a chosen health care provider and to make personal judgments affecting one’s own health and bodily integrity without government interference.” Armstrong, ¶ 72; see also Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n, ¶ 23 (“In pursuing one’s own health, an individual has a fundamental right to obtain and reject medical treatment.”).

The Act Violates The Right To Dignity

• The Montana Constitution provides that “[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 4. The Montana Supreme Court recognizes the right to dignity is a fundamental right, “demand[ing] that people have for themselves the moral right and moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives and the intrinsic value of life in general, answering to their own consciences and convictions.” Armstrong, ¶ 72.
• And “[t]reatment which degrades or demeans persons, that is, treatment which deliberately reduces the value of persons, and which fails to acknowledge their worth as persons, directly violates their dignity.” Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶ 81, 316 Mont. 103, 121, 68 P.3d 872, 884 (quoting Matthew O. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution’s “Dignity” Clause with Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301, 307 (2000)).

The Act Violates The Right To Free Speech And Expression

• The Montana Constitution protects the “vast majority” of speech and provides: “No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech or expression. Every person shall be free to speak or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 7; State v. Dugan, 2013 MT 38, ¶¶ 18, 79, 369 Mont. 39, 44, 68 303 P.3d 755, 761, 776(citation omitted).

Plaintiffs Will Suffer Irreparable Injury

• “Irreparable harm” is “harm for which there is no adequate legal remedy.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014). This includes constitutional harm and “severe, ongoing psychological distress and the high risk of . . . suicide” related to gender dysphoria. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2019); Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n, ¶ 15; Weems v. State ex rel. Fox (Weems I), 2019 MT 98, ¶ 25, 395 Mont. 350, 363, 440 P.3d 4, 13.

Conclusion

FOR THESE REASONS, Plaintiffs Scarlet van Garderen, Jessica van Garderen, Ewout van Garderen, Phoebe Cross, Molly Cross, Paul Cross, Jane Doe, John Doe, Dr. Juanita Hodax, and Dr. Katherine Mistretta respectfully request the entry of an order:

• preliminarily enjoining Defendants, as well as their agents, employees, representatives, and successors, from enforcing the Act, directly or indirectly; and
• granting any other relief the Court deems just.

United States District Court For The District Of Idaho Southern Division

Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting its enforcement. The law by its own terms will not take effect until January 2024. Plaintiffs will work with Defendants’ counsel and the Court to set a schedule for a preliminary injunction motion that will allow the Court to resolve that motion before the law would otherwise take effect.

The Health Care Ban Violates The Fourteenth Amendment--Equal Protection

• The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, protects individuals and groups from discrimination by the government.

The Health Care Ban Violates The Right To Parental Autonomy--Fourteenth Amendment--Due Process Clause

• The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, enforceable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.

Publishing--Fourteenth Amendment--Lack Of Fair Notice

Prayer For Relief

• Enter a judgment declaring that the Healthcare Ban violates the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is therefore unenforceable;
• Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendants and their employees, agents, and successors in office from enforcing the Healthcare Ban;
• Enter a judgment declaring that official publication of the Healthcare Ban in the Idaho Code without clear notice of the law’s unconstitutionality and unenforceability is unconstitutional;
• Issue preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining the members of the Idaho Code Commission and their employees, agents, and successors in office from publishing the Healthcare Ban in the Idaho Code without clear notice of those provisions’ unconstitutionality and unenforceability is unconstitutional;
• Waive the requirement for the posting of a bond as security for entry of preliminary injunctive relief;
• Award Plaintiffs their costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and other applicable laws; and
• Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

In The District Court Of Travis County, Texas

Plaintiffs' Verified Original Petition For Declaratory Judgement And Application For Temporary And Permanent Injunctive Relief

Because the Ban is unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable in its entirety, Plaintiffs seek temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent the Ban from taking effect and causing them immediate and irreparable harm.

SB 14 Violates The Texas Constitution

• Section 37.002 of the UDJA provides that it is remedial, and its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and it is to be liberally construed and administered. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.002(b).
• Under Section 37.003 of the UDJA, a court of proper jurisdiction has the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Id. § 37.003(a). The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect and the declaration has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. Id. § 37.003(b)

Due Course Of Law--Parental Rights

• The Due Course of Law Clause of the Texas Constitution protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Tex. Const. art. I, § 19.

Due Course Of Law--Property Rights

• Under the Texas Constitution, “[n]o citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 19.

Texas Equal Rights Amendment--Sex Discrimination

• Under the Texas Constitution, “[e]quality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed, or national origin.” Tex. Const. art. I, § 3a. It protects individuals and groups from discrimination by the government.

Equal Rights

• The equal rights provision of the Texas Constitution protects transgender people as a class from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating or hostile legislation, such as SB14. See Burroughs v. Lyles, 181 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. 1944).

Prayer For Relief

• Upon hearing, a temporary injunction enjoining and restraining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them from implementing or enforcing any provision of SB14;
• After trial, a permanent injunction enjoining and restraining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them from implementing or enforcing any provision of SB14;
• A judgment against Defendants declaring that SB14 is unconstitutional, void, and unenforceable in its entirety, as described herein, including:
• 1. A declaration that SB14 violates Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution by infringing upon the rights of parents to parental autonomy;
• 2. A declaration that SB14 violates Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution by depriving physicians of their vested property interests in their medical licenses and infringing upon medical providers’ right to occupational liberty;
• 3. A declaration that SB14 violates Article I, Section 3a of the Texas Constitution by discriminating against transgender adolescents and their parents because of sex in violation of their right to equality under the law;
• 4. A declaration that SB14 violates Article I, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution by discriminating against transgender adolescents and their parents because of transgender status in violation of their right to equal rights guaranteed to all persons;
• To retain jurisdiction after judgment for the purposes of issuing further appropriate injunctive relief if the Court’s declaratory judgment is violated;
• To award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009; and
• To grant all other and further relief, general or special, whether in law or equity, as the Court deems just and proper.